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OVERTURNING MA TULA

INTRODUCTION

In order to understand whether damages are appropriate under the
IDEA, consider the following situation. A child with AttentionDeficit/Hyperactivity Disorder' enters the first grade at his local public
school and soon begins to exhibit disruptive behavior. He has trouble
completing his work and occasionally urinates or defecates in his pants.
The other children tease him because of his problems. The parents of
the child request that the school evaluate the child under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") 3 and that the school provide
the child with special education services. The school determines that the
child is not eligible and refuses to provide any services to the child.4 The
parents take advantage of all administrative remedies provided under the
IDEA 5, but the school board still refuses to provide educational services
to the child. Therefore, the parents file a complaint in district court
alleging a violation of the IDEA. They include in this complaint a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,6 seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for the IDEA violation. Few defendants or courts would argue against
awarding the parents an injunction forcing the school to provide the child
with an appropriate education or reimbursement of educational costs, if
the parents can prove an IDEA violation.7 However, the parents feel that

1. See generally Helen Simmons & Ann York, Recognising the Signs of ADHD,
PRACTICE NURSE, Dec. 15, 2006, at 15. Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD") is a behavioral disorder which manifests in childhood. Problematic behaviors
include pervasive inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. See id.
2. See generally W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1995). Matula involved
a child with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder who had difficulty in class and was
teased by classmates for his "bathrooming problem". Id.
3. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2006).
4. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 489. In Matula, the Child Study Team which reviewed
the child's needs, determined that the student's academic performance was at or above
grade level. Id. For this reason, they concluded that he was not classifiable under the
IDEA and therefore not eligible for services. Id.
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006). The IDEA provides procedural safeguards to
protect the interests of disabled children. See id. Before filing a civil action, plaintiffs
must have a hearing before the state or local educational agency and exhaust the appeals
process under the IDEA. See id.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to receive
damages, including compensatory and punitive damages, when a state actor deprives him
of rights under the Constitution or a federal law. See id.; Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,
22 (1980).
7. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,
370 (1985). Appropriate relief under the IDEA may include an injunction to educate the
child in a private institution at public expense or to reimburse a party for the cost of a
private school where necessary to provide the child with a free appropriate public
education. However, these reimbursements should not be characterized as "damages," as
they are merely paying expenses which they should have been paying all along. See id.
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the school board should also pay compensatory and punitive damages,
which are not available under the IDEA.8 Therefore, the parents file a
claim under § 1983, which does allow compensatory and punitive
damages. The parents and child have faced humiliation and frustration.
The child is not receiving a free appropriate public education. Therefore,
they feel entitled to compensatory and punitive damages. On the other
hand, the school district may not be in a financial position to pay a large
damage award. The question facing the court is whether to award
compensatory and punitive damages, which may make the parents and
child feel whole, punish the school board, and deter this and other school
boards from violating the IDEA in the future.
The United States courts of appeals, including the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, have struggled with this question over the last twenty
years. 9 In 1995, the Third Circuit held, in W.B. v. Matula,10 that § 1983
can be used by parents and children seeking monetary damages for
statutory violations of the IDEA.11 In the years following Matula, the
United States courts of appeals were split evenly on this issue. 12 In 2007,
the Third Circuit revisited the Matula decision in A. W. v. Jersey City
Public Schools.13 The court reversed its earlier holding and decided that
§ 1983 cannot be used in conjunction with the IDEA. 14 The Third
Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to explicitly overturn an
earlier holding on the availability of § 1983 as a remedy for IDEA
violations. 5
This Comment will discuss the impact the Third Circuit has had on
the availability of § 1983 remedies for IDEA violations. The Third
Circuit's decision in Matula affected and furthered the initial split among
the federal courts. The recent decision in Jersey City will now begin to
bring an end to this disagreement. Part II of this Comment gives
background information on the IDEA and the federal cases which have
discussed § 1983 as an available remedy for IDEA violations. Part II.A
explains how the IDEA works and how parents and children can bring a
complaint against a school board. Part II.B discusses § 1983 and the

8. See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding
that compensatory and punitive damages are not available under the IDEA); Heidemann
v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that general and punitive damages
are not available under the IDEA); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (stating that
reimbursement of expenses is not the same as damages).
9. See discussion infra Part II.C.
10. 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir. 1995).
11. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494.
12. See discussion infra Part II.C.
13. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
14. See id. at 803.
15. See id. at 792.
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reasons plaintiffs choose to file a § 1983 claim for an IDEA violation.
Next, Part II.C illuminates the disagreement among the federal courts of
appeals. Part II.C.1 relates the arguments presented by circuit courts
which allow § 1983 remedies for IDEA violations, while Part II.C.2
advances the opposing viewpoint against allowing § 1983 remedies. Part
II.D explains the Third Circuit's recent decision in A. W. v. Jersey City
Schools.
Part III of this Comment analyzes the Third Circuit's impact on the
issue of whether § 1983 remedies are available for IDEA violations. Part
III.A discusses the impact that the Third Circuit's initial decision in
Matula had in creating a split among the federal courts of appeals. Part
III.A.1 provides the Third Circuit's reasons for deciding to allow § 1983
remedies for IDEA violations in Matula. This part also analyzes the
arguments that could have been presented to allow the Third Circuit to
deny § 1983 remedies in that case. Part III.A.2 will examine the impact
the Matula decision had on other federal courts of appeals, as well as the
impact the decision would have had if the court had decided it
differently. Next, Part III.B demonstrates the impact the Third Circuit's
decision in Jersey City will have and has already had on other courts.
Part III.B.1 explores the Third Circuit's reasons for hearing Jersey City
and overturning their earlier decision in Matula. Part III.B.2 proposes
the great impact this recent decision will have on other courts and the
future availability of § 1983 for IDEA violations. Finally, Part IV offers
a conclusion on the importance and future implications of the Third
Circuit's recent decision in Jersey City.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Individualswith DisabilitiesEducation Act

In 1975, Congress enacted the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA"),1 6 formerly known as the Education of the
Handicapped Act ("EHA"), 17 which addresses educational needs of
disabled children. 18 Congress's purpose in enacting the statute was to
ensure that all children with disabilities would have access to a "free
16. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2006).
Congress enacted the IDEA under its spending power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141
(1990). Congress changed the name from the Education of the Handicapped Act
("EHA") to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") in 1990. However,
courts will often use EHA and IDEA interchangeably when discussing the Act. See also
W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 491 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining the history of the IDEA and
stating that "EHA" and "IDEA" will be used interchangeably).
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)-(d) (2006).
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appropriate public education."1 9 Under the IDEA, states must submit a
plan to the Secretary of Education showing that they each have policies
and procedures in place that will ensure disabled children's rights to
receive a free appropriate public education.2 °
A child seeking special education services under the IDEA is first
evaluated by either the state or local education agency to determine
whether the child is disabled and to discern the child's educational
needs. 2 1 After the applicable educational agency has evaluated the child,
the parents and school personnel create an individualized education
program (IEP).22 An IEP is a written statement describing the child's
disability, the effect of the disability on the child's progress and
involvement in the general education curriculum, the annual academic
23
and functional goals for the child, and the progress toward those goals.
The IEP also describes the special education services that the school
district will provide to the child.24
Once the school implements an adequate IEP, the child theoretically
should be receiving a free appropriate public education under the IDEA.
However, if the child is not receiving a free appropriate public education,
the IDEA includes procedural safeguards intended to remedy the
* 25
situation.
If a disabled child, or his parents, feels that the school has
violated the IDEA, then that individual may present a complaint to the
state or local educational agency.26 The state or local educational agency
will conduct an impartial due process hearing.27 If the hearing is held by
the local educational agency, then the parties may choose to appeal to the
state educational agency.28 If a hearing is initially heard by or appealed
to the state educational agency, it will result in a final decision.29 Parties
may not bring a civil action based on the complaint until they have
exhausted the administrative procedures under the IDEA. 30 A party
bringing a civil action based on an IDEA violation may seek remedies
under the IDEA itself, or may seek additional remedies under "other

19. Id. § 1400(d)(1).
20. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
21. Seeid. § 1414(a).
22. See id.§ 1414(d).
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. § 1415.
26. See id.§ 1415(b)(6).
27. Seeid. § 1415(f).
28. See id.§ 1415(g).
29. See id.
30. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). A party who has received a final decision under the
procedures of the IDEA may bring a civil action seeking remedies in any state court or
federal district court. See id.
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Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities."'" These
federal laws include the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, and Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.32
B.

Section 1983 and the IDEA

Plaintiffs cannot seek compensatory or punitive damages under the
IDEA.3 3 However, damages are available under § 1983 for violations of
some federal statutes.34 Section 1983 5 does not create new rights.36
Instead, § 1983 "creates a species of tort liability in favor of persons who
are deprived of rights, privileges or immunities secured to them by the
Constitution. 37 Damages for § 1983 claims are generally determined
according to the principles of common law torts and are intended to
compensate plaintiffs for injuries caused by the deprivation of their
constitutional rights.38
Plaintiffs can use § 1983 to remedy statutory violations, provided
that the statute being violated does not fall within one of two

31. Id. § 1415(1).
32. Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2008)
(discouraging discrimination against disabled persons); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2008) (empowering disabled persons to maximize employment, self
sufficiency, and integration into society).
33. See, e.g., Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that compensatory and punitive damages are not available under the IDEA);
Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that damages are not
available under the IDEA).
34. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980) (holding that punitive
damages are available under § 1983).
35. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
36. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6 (1980); see generally, Jack M. Beermann,
Why do Plaintiffs Sue PrivateParties Under Section 1983, 26 CARDOZO.L.REv. 9 (2004)
(discussing available relief under § 1983 and why plaintiffs choose to bring a claim based
on § 1983 with or instead of claims based on other laws).
37. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986) (internal
citations omitted).
38. See id.
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exceptions. 39 The first exception applies to federal statutes in which
Congress explicitly forecloses § 1983 enforcement in the language of the
statute itself.40 This exception does not apply to the IDEA, as the IDEA
does not explicitly include or preclude § 1983 remedies. 4' The second
exception applies to federal statutes that have a comprehensive remedial
scheme which implies that Congress intended to foreclose all other
remedies.42
In Smith v. Robinson,43 the Supreme Court decided whether the
IDEA fit into this second exception to § 1983 availability. 44 In Smith, the
plaintiff filed claims for relief under the IDEA, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 45 and § 1983, among others. 46 The main issue was
the award of attorney's fees, which were not yet available under the
IDEA.47 The plaintiff argued that the language of § 1983, which protects
"rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,"
included the IDEA as one of those laws.48 Therefore, the plaintiff
argued, attorney's fees should be available for IDEA violations under
§ 1983. 49
The Court rejected this argument and determined that the IDEA
provided a comprehensive remedial scheme, indicating Congress's intent
to foreclose other remedies.5 0 This comprehensive scheme included all
the claims for relief brought under laws other than the IDEA." In its
holding, the Court explicitly concluded that § 1983 claims could not be
brought to remedy IDEA violations. 2 The dissent in Smith invited
Congress to revisit the matter and clarify the availability of damages
under "other laws" for IDEA violations.53
In response to the Smith Court's holding and the dissent's invitation
to revisit the issue of IDEA remedies, Congress held hearings and
39.
423-24
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
(1987).
See id. at 423.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006).
See Wright, 479 U.S. at 423.
468 U.S. 992 (1984).
See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-10 (1984).

See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
46. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 994-95.
47. See id. at 995.
48. Id. at 1005; 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

49. See Smith, 468 U.S. at 1003. Plaintiffs also brought claims based on § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 994.
50. See id. at 1009.
51. See id.
52.

Seeid. at 1013.

53. See id. at 1030-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Congress will now have to take the
time to revisit the matter.").
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amended the IDEA. 54 The congressional reports on the amendment
specifically discussed Smith as the catalyst for the amendment.5 5
However, the reports focused mainly on the availability of attorneys'
fees and the availability of remedies under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. 56 Congress added § 1415(1) to the IDEA as part of this
amendment.5 7 This section explicitly allows parties to seek "remedies
available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities. ' 58 The provision does
not explicitly include § 1983 as an available remedy.59
The new provision's lack of specificity regarding § 1983 leaves
room for advocacy.
Parties seeking to support an expansive
interpretation could argue that the amendment completely overturned
Smith and, therefore, § 1983 may be used to remedy IDEA violations.60
On the other hand, the opposition could argue that § 1983 is not
expressly included in the amendment and is still not an available
remedy. 61 The split among the United States courts of appeals emerged
from these two arguments.62

54. See S. REP. No. 99-112 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798; H.R.
REP. No. 99-296 (1985); 99 Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796 (1986).
55. See S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798,
1799 (explaining the holding in Smith and stating amendment is response to Smith's
dissent, which invited Congress to revisit the remedies under the IDEA); H.R. REP. No.
99-296, at 4 (1985) (quoting dissent from Smith explaining one intended consequence of
amendment is to "re-establish statutory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Smith v. Robinson").
56. See S. REP. No. 99-112, at 13 (1985), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1798,
1803; H.R. REP. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985); H.R. REP. No. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.),
as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808.
57. See Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100
Stat. 796 (1986). The amendment also added a provision which awarded attorney's fees
under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1); see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213 (2006); Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-799
(2006).
59. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
60. See generally Terry Jean Seligmann, A Diller, A Dollar: Section 1983 Damage
Claims in Special Education Lawsuits, 36 GA. L. REv. 465, 501 (2002) (discussing
courts' reasoning in upholding § 1983 claims for IDEA violations based on the
nonexclusivity language of the statute).
61. See generally id. at 500-01 (discussing the reasoning used by courts to hold that
§ 1983 damages are not available for IDEA violations because the statute does not
explicitly include § 1983).
62. See generally Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Can Section 1983 Be Used to Redress
Violations of the IDEA?, 161 ED. LAW REP. 21, 24-32 (2002) (explaining the circuit split
and summarizing key cases on each side).
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The Split Among the United States Courts of Appeals Before A.W.
v. Jersey City Public Schools

After the congressional amendment in 1986, the United States
courts of appeals confronted the issue of whether § 1983 provided

additional remedies for IDEA violations. Between 1986 and 1997, three
circuits, the Second, Third, and Seventh, explicitly held that plaintiffs
could use § 1983 in conjunction with the IDEA.63 In this same time

period, three circuits, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh, implied the
availability of § 1983, but did not issue definitive holdings allowing the
use of § 1983.64 The Eighth Circuit was split within itself and the issue

remained unsettled.65
Between 1996 and 2006, the circuit courts began a trend in
opposition to these earlier holdings. During these years, three circuit
courts, the First, Fourth, and Tenth, held that plaintiffs could not use

§ 1983 as a remedy for alleged IDEA violations.66 As of 2006, twenty
years after the congressional amendment to the IDEA that added
§ 1415(1), the circuit courts were evenly split. There were three circuits
on each side of the split, and five circuits undecided or refusing to decide
the issue.6 7 The Ninth Circuit made no ruling on the issue.

63. See Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Congress
provided for § 1983 availability to enforce the IDEA); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494
(3d Cir. 1995) ("Congress specifically intended that [IDEA] violations could be redressed
by § 504 and § 1983 actions."); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987)
("[P]arents are entitled to bring a § 1983 action based on alleged violations of the
[IDEA].").
64. See N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996)
(implying the availability of § 1983 for an alleged IDEA violation, but holding that
administrative remedies must first be exhausted and declining to rule on the availability
of § 1983); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir.
1992) (stating that a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim, but holding that damages were
unavailable for other reasons); Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F. 2d 1188,
1193 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990) (dicta) (stating that parties "may continue to allege violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983" in conjunction with alleged IDEA violations).
65. Compare Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 250 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff was entitled to bring a § 1983 action based on
alleged violations of the IDEA), with Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that punitive and compensatory damages were not available under § 1983
for IDEA violations).
66. See Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2006) ("[Section]
1983 cannot be used to escape the strictures on damages under the IDEA."); Padilla v.
Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 1983 is
not available for IDEA violations); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529
(4th Cir. 1998) ("[P]arties may not sue under § 1983 for an IDEA violation.").
67. See discussion infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
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The Cases Allowing § 1983 Remedies for IDEA Violations

In 1986, soon after the passage of the congressional amendment, the
Third Circuit heard Board of Education v. Diamond.68 In Diamond, the
court determined that the congressional amendment to the IDEA
overruled the Supreme Court's holding in Smith. 69 However, in deciding
Diamond,the Third Circuit did not directly confront the issue of whether
§ 1983 could be used for IDEA violations. 70
A year later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited to Diamond
when it decided Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi.71

In Tirozzi, a group of parents

brought § 1983 claims for IDEA violations, on behalf of their disabled
children.72 The decision explained the history of the IDEA and
Congress's reasons for the amendment.73 The Second Circuit agreed
with Diamond that the congressional amendment to the IDEA had
overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Robinson, that the
IDEA's comprehensive remedial scheme precluded § 1983 claims.74
Therefore, the Second Circuit held that parties were entitled to bring
§ 1983 actions based on IDEA violations.7 5
In 1995, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard W.B. v. Matula
and held that plaintiffs could use § 1983 claims to seek damages for
IDEA violations.7 6 In Matula, a disabled child's mother filed a § 1983
claim based on an alleged IDEA violation. To decide whether the § 1983
claim was appropriate, the court examined the history of the IDEA, the
Supreme Court's holding in Smith, and the legislative history of the
congressional amendment to the IDEA.77 The Third Circuit then pointed
to Diamond to show that it had already held that the congressional
amendment overruled Smith. 78 Based on statements in the legislative

68. 808 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986).
69. See id. at 995. In Diamond, the plaintiff student suffered from congenital
physical abnormalities and required private education, which was paid for by the public
school. The school changed the child's educational placement, which resulted in a
deterioration of his skills. The court ordered the school to reimburse educational
expenses, to continue a residential placement in a private school, and redraft his
Individualized Education Program. They reversed and remanded a dismissal of a claim
for damages. See id.
70. See id. at 993-94.
71. See Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1987).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 755.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995).
77. See id. at 493-94.
78. See id. at 494.
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record, the court found that Congress specifically intended for § 1983's
availability to redress IDEA violations when enacting the amendment.79
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Marie 0. v.
Edgar ° and agreed with the Second and Third Circuits that § 1983
claims are available for IDEA violations. 81 In Edgar, four disabled
children filed a class action suit, including a § 1983 claim, for alleged
IDEA violations.82 Like the two circuit courts which had previously
decided this issue, the Seventh Circuit looked at the ruling in Smith and
the legislative response to that ruling. 83 The court determined that
Congress responded to Smith by adding 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) to the
IDEA. 84 After a close reading of § 1415(1), the Seventh Circuit
determined that Congress intended for § 1983 claims to be utilized to
the court held that § 1983 claims were
enforce the IDEA. 85 Therefore,
86
available for IDEA violations.
The Seventh Circuit was the last federal court of appeals to
explicitly decide that § 1983 claims are allowed for IDEA violations.
However, during the time between the Second Circuit deciding Tirozzi in
1987 and the Seventh Circuit deciding Edgar in 1997, four other circuit
courts of appeals decided cases involving plaintiffs with § 1983 claims
based on IDEA violations.87 However, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits decided their cases based on separate issues, and did not resolve
§ 1983 availability. 88 The Eighth Circuit allowed a § 1983 claim, but
89
later held, inconsistently, that a plaintiff could not bring a § 1983 claim.
In 1990, the Fifth Circuit decided Angela L. v. Pasadena
Independent School District,9" which primarily dealt with whether a

79. See id. ("[I]n enacting [§ 1415(1)], Congress specifically intended that [IDEA]
violations could be redressed by § 504 and § 1983 actions, as the legislative history
reveals."); see also S. REP. No. 99-112, at 2 (1985), as reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1798, 1799; H.R. REP. No. 99-687, at 7 (1986)(Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1809; H.R. Rep. No. 99-296, at 4 (1985).
80. 131 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1997).
81. See Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 621 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. See id. at 611.
83. Seeid. at 620-21.
84. See id. at 621.
85. See id. at 622.
86. See id. at 621.
87. See Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.3d 245, 247 (8th Cir.
1988); N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11 th Cir. 1996); Crocker v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 283, 287 (6th Cir. 1992); Angela L. v.
Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1990).
88. See cases cited supra note 64.
89. See cases cited supra note 65.
90. 918 F.2d 188(5th Cir. 1990).
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disabled child could recover attorney's fees. 91 The court determined that
the plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees under the IDEA, making a
§ 1983 claim unnecessary.92 However, the Fifth Circuit stated, in dicta,
that parties could continue to bring claims under § 1983 for alleged
IDEA violations.9 3 The court noted that the congressional amendment to
the IDEA had overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in Smith, and
§ 1983 claims were permitted for IDEA violations.9 4
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals implied § 1983 availability
when it decided Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association in 1992. 95 In Crocker, a disabled student transferred to a
new school where he was not immediately allowed to participate in
certain sporting events due to the School Athletic Association's transfer
rule.96 The student alleged that the school's decision was a violation of
the IDEA and included a § 1983 claim in his complaint.9 7 The Sixth
Circuit determined that the IDEA is meant to ensure an education, not to
ensure participation in sporting events.98 The court found that the
plaintiff could not recover damages under the IDEA and was therefore
precluded from recovering damages under § 1983. 99 This ruling implies
that if the plaintiff could have recovered damages under the IDEA, he
may have been allowed to recover damages under § 1983 as well. 0°
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided N.B. v.
Alachua County School Board,10 1 which similarly implied that plaintiffs
could bring § 1983 claims based on IDEA violations. 12 In Alachua, a
disabled child brought a civil action alleging an IDEA violation,
including a § 1983 claim, without first seeking administrative remedies
available under the IDEA.' °3 The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiff
could not pursue a § 1983 claim in this case because she had not
exhausted the IDEA's administrative procedures. ° 4 Therefore, the court
91.
1990).
92.
93.

See Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188, 1188-89 (5th Cir.
See id. at 1196-97.
See id. at 1193 n.3.

94. See id.
95.
1992).

See Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir.

96. See id. at 383-84. Under the transfer rule, students who transferred from one
member school to another member school were ineligible to participate in specified
sports for one year unless the transfer was due to a residence change. See id. at 384.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id.
See id. at 386-87.
See id. at 387.
See id.
84 F.3d 1376 (llth Cir. 1996).
See N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11 th Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1378.
See id. at 1379.
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declined to rule on the availability of § 1983 for IDEA violations.10 5 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that plaintiffs may not file suit under § 1983 until
they have exhausted the administrative remedies under the IDEA.'0 6 The
if they
court's statement implies that plaintiffs may file suit under § 1983
07
IDEA.
the
under
procedures
administrative
the
have followed
In 1988, the Eighth Circuit decided Digre v. Roseville Schools
Independent District No. 623,108 which involved a parent of a disabled
child who brought a § 1983 claim as part of an action for an alleged
IDEA violation. 0 9 The court discussed the Supreme Court's holding in
Smith and the legislative history of the congressional amendment to the
IDEA. 10 Based on this discussion, the court determined that plaintiffs
could bring § 1983 actions based on alleged IDEA violations." While
the court agreed with the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits in this
instance, the Eighth Circuit has not been consistent in its holdings
12
regarding the availability of § 1983 to redress alleged IDEA violations."
2.

The Cases Denying § 1983 Claims for IDEA Violations

In 1996, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Heidemann v.
Rother," 3 where a disabled child and parent sought general and punitive
damages under § 1983 for an alleged IDEA violation. 1 4 The Eighth
Circuit held that § 1983 did not allow plaintiffs to receive punitive and
compensatory damages for IDEA violations. 15 In making this decision,
the court did not discuss its earlier, inconsistent holding in Digre v.
Roseville Schools Independent District No. 623. 116 In Digre, the Eighth
Circuit held that § 1983 claims were permissible in conjunction with
IDEA violations. 17 In Heidemann, the court determined that general and

105. See id. at 1378.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 1379.
108. 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1998).
109. See Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 247 (8th Cir.
1988).
110. See id. at 250.
111. See id.
112. Compare Digre, 841 F.2d at 250 (holding that plaintiffs could bring § 1983
actions based on IDEA violations), with Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th
Cir. 1996) (holding that punitive and compensatory damages were not available under
§ 1983 for IDEA violations).
113. 84 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 1996).
114. See Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1025.
115. See id. at 1033.
116. See id.; Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245 (8th Cir.
1988).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
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punitive damages are not available under the IDEA.' 8 Therefore, the
Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not use § 1983 to receive
damages for the alleged IDEA violation. 1 9 The Eighth Circuit has not
resolved this issue, and the matter remains unsettled.
However,
Heidemann was the beginning of a trend in the circuit courts, away from
§ 1983 availability for IDEA violations.
In 1998, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Sellers v.
School Board of Manassas,120 which involved a disabled child and his
parents suing for compensatory and punitive damages under the IDEA
and § 1983.121 The plaintiff partially relied on Matula in trying to
convince the court to allow § 1983 damages for the alleged IDEA
violation.' 22 The Fourth Circuit was not persuaded by the reasoning in
Matula.123 The Fourth Circuit instead found that § 19831 24is not an
available remedy for alleged IDEA violations for two reasons.
The first reason for the court's decision was the comprehensive
remedial scheme in the IDEA.125 The Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme
Court's ruling in Smith v. Robinson, finding that the IDEA's
comprehensive remedial scheme showed Congress's intent to preclude §
1983 claims for IDEA violations. 26 The court then looked at the
congressional amendment to determine whether the amendment had
overturned the holding in Smith. 127 The provision Congress added, 20
U.S.C. § 1415(1), does not explicitly include § 1983 as one of the laws
available to redress IDEA violations. 28 Section 1415(1) allows plaintiffs
to use "other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with
disabilities" besides the laws explicitly listed.' 29 The Fourth Circuit
explained that § 1983 is a general statute, which does not speak of youth
or disability, and could not be considered an "other" federal law
protecting the rights of disabled children. 30 Therefore, the court
reasoned, § 1415(1) does not implicitly include § 1983 claims.' 3' For
these reasons, the court determined that the congressional amendment
had not overturned Smith's holding on the availability of § 1983 for
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131

See Heidemann, 84 F.3d at 1033.
See id.
141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).
See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 525 (4th Cir. 1998).
See id. at 529.
See id.
See id. at 529-32.
See id. at 529.
See id. at 529-30; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984).
See Sellers, 141 F.3d at 530.
See id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
See Sellers, 141 F.3d at 530.
Sep id
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IDEA violations.' 32 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit believed that the
reasoning in Smith was still persuasive and that the comprehensive
remedial scheme of the IDEA precludes § 1983.133
The second reason the Fourth Circuit denied the § 1983 claim is
based on a rule of interpretation used for statutes like the IDEA. 34 In
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,'35 the Supreme Court
announced a rule of interpretation for statutes enacted under the spending
power. 136 The Court explained that these statutes are much like contracts
between the federal and state governments.' 37 The states must
voluntarily and knowingly accept the terms of the contract. 138 In order to
put a condition on the receipt of federal money, the statute must be
unambiguous. 139 Since Congress enacted the IDEA under its spending
power, the Fourth Circuit decided that this rule of interpretation applied
to the IDEA. 140 Therefore, the IDEA must be unambiguous about the
availability of § 1983 claims. 14 1 The court noted that § 1415(1) "fails to
state, or even imply that [§] 1983 suits may be brought for IDEA
violations."1 42 The court determined that this omission was significant
and, therefore, the IDEA was ambiguous on whether § 1983 claims were
available.1 43 Due to this lack of clarity, the states could not have
voluntarily and knowingly accepted the consequences. 144 Based on these
reasons, the Fourth Circuit held that § 1983 damages were not available
under the 1ambiguous
language and comprehensive remedial scheme of
45
the IDEA.
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Padilla v.
School District No. 1 of Denver,146 where a disabled child included a
§ 1983 claim in her action based on an alleged IDEA violation. 147 The
Tenth Circuit held that § 1983 is not available to redress violations of the
IDEA. 48 The court examined the Supreme Court's holding in Smith and

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See id.
See id.
See id.
at 530-31.
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Sellers, 141 F.3d at 532.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
233 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2000).
See Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2000).
See id.
at 1274.
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the subsequent congressional amendment. 49 It also looked at Supreme
Court cases involving statutes similar to the IDEA. 5 ° In doing so, the
Tenth Circuit found that the Supreme Court did not view the
congressional amendment as overturning Smith's holding regarding
§ 1983 claims. 51 The Padilla court specifically cited two Supreme
Court cases, Blessing v. Freestone and Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority, as evidence of this view.' 52 In
both of these cases, the Court was deciding whether a § 1983 claim was
appropriate based on a federal law.' 53 In Blessing, a group of mothers
sued Arizona's child support agency under § 1983 to enforce Title IV-D
of the Social Security Act.154 In Wright, tenants of a low income housing
project brought a § 1983 claim based on the Brooke Amendment of the
Housing Act of 1937.155 In these cases, the Court determined whether
the federal law at issue precluded § 1983 claims. 56 In both cases, the
Supreme Court cited to Smith v. Robinson and used the IDEA as an
example of a statute with a remedial scheme that is so comprehensive as
to preclude § 1983 claims. 57 The comparison with the IDEA resulted in
a finding that neither the Social Security Act nor the Brooke Amendment
to the Housing Act had remedial schemes as comprehensive as the
IDEA. 158 Therefore, in both cases, § 1983 claims were possible.' 59 The
Tenth Circuit used these two cases as evidence that the Supreme Court
considered Smith "to be alive and well insofar as it asserts that § 1983
may not be used to remedy IDEA violations.' 160 Based on this evidence,
the Tenth Circuit 6held
that § 1983 claims were not available to redress
1
IDEA violations. 1
In 2006, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided Diaz-Fonsecav.
Puerto Rico,' 62 in which a disabled child and her parent brought a § 1983
149. See id. at 1273.
150. See id. See also Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 1273-74; see also Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wright, 479 U.S. at
423-24.
153. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 332; Wright, 479 U.S. at 419.
154. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 332; Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 651-669b.
155. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 419; Brooke Amendment of the Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1401.
156. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24.
157. See Padilla, 233 F.3d at 1273; Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wright, 479 U.S. at
423-24.
158. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-48; Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24.
159. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 347-38; Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24.
160. Padilla,233 F.3d at 1274.
161. See id.
162. 451 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2006).
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claim for an alleged IDEA violation.163 The First Circuit held that
§ 1983 was not available for violations of the IDEA. 164 To make this
decision, the court looked at a previous case, Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto
Rico, 165 in which it held that punitive and general compensatory damages
166
were not available in a private action based on an IDEA violation.
Since the court had already held that money damages are not available
under the IDEA, the First Circuit rejected the argument in Diaz-Fonseca
67
that damages should be available under § 1983 for an IDEA violation.
It explained that allowing plaintiffs to obtain money damages under
§ 1983 "would subvert.., the overall scheme that Congress envisioned
for dealing with educational disabilities, as well as the purpose of the
IDEA, which simply is to ensure [free appropriate public education].', 68
The court decided that if a case turned entirely
on statutory rights created
169
used.
be
not
could
1983
§
then
IDEA,
by the
D.

The Third CircuitCourt ofAppeals Overturns W.B. v. Matula

In 2007, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals revisited the issue of the
availability of § 1983 claims for IDEA violations in A. W. v. Jersey City
Public Schools. 7 ° Eleven years earlier, in W.B. v. Matula, the Third
Circuit held that a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim predicated on an
IDEA violation.' 17 The court noted in Jersey City that it was not alone in
this reasoning at the time they decided Matula.172 However, since
Matula, other courts had criticized the Third Circuit's decision and a
circuit split had occurred. 173 The Third Circuit specifically mentioned
the convincing arguments of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits in not
allowing § 1983 remedies. 74 This reasoning from the other Circuits may

163. See Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2006).
164. See id. at 28.
165. 353 F.3d 108 (1st Cir. 2006).
166. See Nieves Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2006).
167. See Diaz-Fonseca,451 F.3d at 28.
168. Id. at 29 (citing Nieves-Marquez, 353 F.3d at 125) (internal quotations omitted).
169. See id.
170. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
171. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. In Matula, the court reasoned that the
congressional amendment to the IDEA had overturned the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith. Accordingly, the Matula court held that plaintiffs could bring § 1983 claims based
on IDEA violations. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484,493-95 (3d Cir. 1995).
172. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 797 ("[W]e were not alone in this view at the time,
as we cited to numerous other courts' opinions ....).
173. See id. at 797-98 (recognizing that the Fourth and Tenth Circuits disagreed with
the decision in Matula).
174. See id. at 798-99; see Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268,
1273-74 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court considers Smith to be alive and well
insofar as it asserts that [§] 1983 may not be used to remedy IDEA violations."); Sellers
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have caused the Third Circuit to question Matula.175 However, the
176
Supreme Court's reasoning in City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams
convinced the Third Circuit to reconsider the availability of § 1983
77
claims for IDEA violations.1
In 2005, the Supreme Court decided Rancho Palos Verdes, which
concerned a § 1983 action brought in relation to a violation of the
Telecommunications Act. 178 The Court determined that § 1983 was not
available to remedy violations of statutory rights where the statute had a
comprehensive remedial scheme. 179 To make this decision, the Supreme
Court engaged in an analysis of § 1983 availability for statutory
violations.' 80 The Court recognized that, if a plaintiff can demonstrate
that he is entitled to individual rights under a federal statute, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.' The
presumption can be defeated by showing that Congress did not intend for
§ 1983 claims to be available. 82 One way to prove that Congress did not
so intend, is to show that the statute has a comprehensive remedial
scheme. 183 The Court cited to Smith v. Robinson and the IDEA as an
example of a comprehensive remedial scheme.1 84
If there is a
comprehensive remedial scheme, a plaintiff must show a "textual
indication, express or implicit, that the remedy is to complement, rather
than supplant, § 1983. ' ' 85
In Jersey City, the Third Circuit applied this reasoning from Rancho
Palos Verdes to determine whether Congress intended § 1983 as a
remedy for IDEA violations. 86 The court examined the administrative
procedures of the IDEA and determined that the IDEA has a
comprehensive remedial scheme. 187 The court then looked for a textual
indication that § 1983 should still be available despite the comprehensive

v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (arguing that the IDEA's comprehensive
remedial scheme precludes § 1983 actions for IDEA violations).
175. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 798-99 (noting that the court "would have been
conflicted as to whether to revisit" the availability of § 1983 for IDEA violations based
solely on the arguments of the other circuit courts).
176. 544 U.S. 113 (2005).
177. See id. at 799-800 (explaining their reliance on City of Rancho Palos Verdes v.
Abrams in making the decision to overturn their earlier holding).
178. See City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 118 (2005).
179. Seeid.at 121.
180. See id. at 120-22.
181. See id. at 119-20.
182. See id.
at 120.
183. See id. at 121-22.
184. See id.

185.

See id. at 122.

186.

See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 802 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).

187.

See id.
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remedial scheme.188 Section 1415(1) of the IDEA does not explicitly list
§ 1983 as one of the available laws to redress IDEA violations. 8 9
Additionally, the Jersey City court could find no implicit inclusion of §
1983 in the IDEA.' 90 Therefore, the Third Circuit agreed with the Fourth
and Tenth Circuits, as well as the reasoning in Smith, that the IDEA's
comprehensive remedial scheme precludes § 1983 actions.' 9' The Third
Circuit stated that "we are now convinced that our ruling in 92Matula is no
longer sound" and, therefore, overturned its earlier holding. 1
III. ANALYSIS
When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided W.B. v. Matula in
1995, the issue of § 1983 availability for IDEA violations was largely
unsettled among the United States courts of appeals.' 93 At the time, the
Second Circuit and the Eighth Circuit were the only courts of appeals
which had decided the issue.' 94 The lack of discussion on the availability
of § 1983 claims based on IDEA violations gave the Third Circuit the
opportunity to have a significant impact on other courts. 195 If the Third
Circuit had decided differently in Matula, the circuit split regarding
§ 1983 availability would likely not have occurred. 196 Now that the
Third Circuit has reconsidered its earlier holding and reversed Matula,
other circuits may revisit this issue and end the 97
disagreement over the
availability of § 1983 claims for IDEA violations.
A.

W.B. v. Matula's Impact on the CircuitSplit Regarding the
Availability of§ 1983 Claimsfor IDEA Violations

In W.B. v. Matula, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied heavily
on the legislative history of the congressional amendment to the IDEA to
188. See id. at 803.
189. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2006).
190. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 803.
191. See id.; see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009 (1984); Padilla v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000); Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of
Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998).
192. Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 799.
193. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
194. See Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to bring a § 1983 action based on an IDEA
violation); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that § 1983
actions were appropriate for IDEA violations).
195. See, e.g., Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. I of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Matula when noting the circuit split); Sellers v. School Board of Manassas,
141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the plaintiff's case relied partially on
Matula).
196. See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
197. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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hold that Congress intended availability of § 1983 remedies for IDEA
violations.' 98 The court did not discuss other arguments for or against
§ 1983 availability and there is the possibility that neither party advanced
additional arguments. 99 However, if the Third Circuit had considered
other arguments that could have been made at the time, it may have
decided that § 1983 was precluded by the IDEA.20 0 If the Third Circuit
had held that the IDEA precluded § 1983 claims and that § 1983
damages were not available for IDEA violations, then the circuit split
might not have happened at all.2 °1
1.

The Arguments Which Could Have Persuaded the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals to Deny § 1983 Claims for IDEA
Violations in W.B. v. Matula

When the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided Matula, it focused
mainly on the legislative history of the congressional amendment to the
IDEA.2 °2 This focus led the court to determine that the congressional
amendment had overturned Smith v. Robinson, and § 1983 claims were
available to enforce the IDEA.2 °3 By focusing on the legislative history
of the amendment, the Third Circuit ignored a number of other
arguments which could have applied to the issue.
There are three arguments which would have compelled a different
result. The first argument uses Supreme Court precedent regarding
statutes enacted under the spending power to preclude § 1983 damages
based on IDEA violations. The second argument discusses how the
different standards of liability for statutory and constitutional violations
can help determine legislative intent. The third argument invokes a
public policy against forcing school boards to pay large damage awards.
The court could have used these arguments to bolster a decision against
allowing § 1983 claims for IDEA violations.
The first argument deals with the interpretation of statutes, like the
IDEA, which were enacted under Congress' spending power. 2 4 In the
1981 case of Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, the
Supreme Court gave a rule on how statutes enacted under the spending

198.
199.
IDEA
IDEA
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493-94 (3d Cir. 1995).
See generally id. (discussing legislative history of congressional amendment to
as the main reason for their holding that section 1983 claims are available for
violations).
See discussion infra Part III.A. 1.
See discussion infra Part III.A.2.
See Matula, 67 F.3d at 493-94.
See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 1.
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power should be interpreted.2 °5 The Court explained that Congress's
power to legislate pursuant to the spending power results in legislation
that is much like a contract.2 °6 The Pennhurst court stated that the
"legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power
rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of
the 'contract. ,,27 Therefore, any statute enacted under the spending
power must clearly state its requirements for federal funding to enable
states to knowingly choose whether to comply with the statute.20 8
The Matula court did not discuss the Pennhurst Court's rule of
interpretation in making its decision. However, three years after Matula,
the Fourth Circuit discussed this method of interpretation in Sellers v.
School Board ofManassas when it determined that § 1983 claims are not
available for IDEA violations. 20 9 The Sellers court reasoned that § 1983
permits damages, whereas the IDEA does not.210 Permitting damages
through § 1983 for IDEA violations would subject states to much higher
damages than what is available through the IDEA itself. If Congress had
intended this result, it would have needed to clearly state the availability
of § 1983 in order to allow states to knowingly choose such open-ended
liability. 2 11 Pennhurst was decided fourteen years before Matula,21 2 and
the Third Circuit arguably should have used the Pennhurst rule of
interpretation to analyze the IDEA. If it had employed this rule of
interpretation, the Third Circuit would have discovered that the IDEA
does not clearly state that § 1983 is an available remedy for IDEA
violations.21 3
A second argument the Matula court could arguably have used to
decide that the IDEA precludes § 1983 is based on the different standards
of liability for statutory and constitutional violations. Liability for
statutory violations under the IDEA is relatively low, whereas liability
for constitutional violations can be much higher. The Matula court did
not discuss the discrepancy in allowing § 1983 damages for statutory
violations. In Sellers, the Fourth Circuit did discuss the different
standards of liability to bolster its decision that § 1983 was not available
as a remedy for IDEA violations.21 4 While the Third Circuit decided
205.

See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998).
Seeid. at532.
See Sellers id. at 531-32 (applying the rule stated by the Supreme Court in

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17).

212. See Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 17.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
214.

See Sellers, 141 F.3d at 531.
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Matula three years before Sellers, the same argument would have
applied.
This argument examines the differences in liability between an
IDEA violation and an Equal Protection Clause violation. A school
district violates the IDEA when it fails to provide a free appropriate
public education to a disabled child.215 The disabled child need only
prove that he was not receiving a free appropriate public education to
prove a statutory IDEA violation.21 6 If the disabled child successfully
proves a statutory IDEA violation, he may receive remedies under the
IDEA.21 7 However, a school district violates the Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution when it intentionally discriminates
against disabled children.218 Section 1983 remedies become available if
a disabled child can prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
which involves
a much more difficult standard of proof than a statutory
21 9
violation.

In order to prove a constitutional violation, the child and his parents
must show purposeful discrimination by the school district against
disabled children. 2 If a plaintiff proves intentional discrimination, then
he will have to additionally show that the discrimination was without
rational basis. The rational basis standard applies because disabled
children are not a protected class and education is not a fundamental
right. 221 Rational basis is a difficult standard for a plaintiff to overcome
because it requires the plaintiff to prove that a school board had no
rational basis for the decision.222 Due to this high standard, a disabled
child will find it difficult to prove purposeful discrimination and prevail
on a constitutional claim against a school board.223 It is much easier for a
plaintiff to prove that he is not receiving a free appropriate public
education than it is to prove intentional discrimination. Therefore, a
§ 1983 claim based on a constitutional violation would be less likely to
occur, whereas a § 1983 claim, including compensatory and punitive
damages, based on a statutory violation would be more common.

215. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006).
216.
217.

See id.
See id.

218. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
219. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 (1980).
220. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring an Equal
Protection claim to be supported by evidence of purposeful discrimination).
221.

See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445-46 (1985)

(holding that disabled persons are not a protected class); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973) (holding that education is not a fundamental right).
222.

See Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 530-31 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing use of

rational basis standard in this context).
223.

See id.
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Congress could not have intended liability for statutory IDEA
violations to be the same as the much more difficult to prove
constitutional violations. This implicit intent is shown by the much
higher standard of proof required for constitutional violations. If the
Matula court had analyzed these burdens of proof, then it would arguably
have decided that the discrepancy was too large and, therefore, Congress
could not have intended for § 1983 damages to be available for IDEA
violations.
A final argument the Third Circuit could have discussed to disallow
§ 1983 claims, or to bolster one of the previous arguments against § 1983
claims, concerns the public policy involved in the issue. Good public
policy would disallow § 1983 damages for statutory IDEA violations in
order to protect school boards from large damage awards. Allowing
plaintiffs to use § 1983 exposes school boards to high financial liability
in any situation where a disabled child feels that the education being
provided is inappropriate or below standard. Public schools are financed
by tax money. Large damage awards could put more pressure on the
school and the taxpayers. A large damage award could force local
governments to raise taxes in the school districts to pay for the liability.
Great liability could also cause the school district to cut costs in other
areas, such as sports, art or music curriculum. This result would affect
more children and could negatively impact their educational
opportunities.
Some could argue that compensatory and punitive damages are
4
aimed at deterring other possible defendants from violating the IDEA.1
Arguably, denying these damages could allow school boards to ignore
the needs of their disabled students because they have no fear of
punishment. However, this argument must fail. The threat of litigation
expenses and possible reimbursement of educational costs related to
IDEA violations should be enough to deter school boards, as well as the
possible denial of federal funding if they do not follow the IDEA.225
Large damage awards may deter school districts from intentional
violations; however, IDEA violations can be inadvertent or the result of a
mistaken administrator. The school boards involved in these cases are
rarely acting intentionally to deny an education to the student, and
damages do not deter unintentional or inadvertent behavior.
224. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (explaining
that deterrence can operate through a mechanism of compensatory damages, in addition
to punitive damages).
225. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2006) (requiring states to adhere to the IDEA in order to
receive certain federal funds); Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of
Mass., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (holding that a school must reimburse costs if private
education is necessary for a free appropriate public education).
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For these reasons, good public policy should disallow damages
against school boards. The remedies under the IDEA are fair and are
aimed at helping the disabled plaintiff receive a free appropriate public
education.226 Congress is unlikely to want to expose school boards to
high financial liabilities, which would benefit a few students, when the
effect would be felt by many.
In Matula, the Third Circuit did not discuss any of these arguments.
Instead they focused on legislative history and held that § 1983 claims
were available for IDEA violations. 7 If the court had analyzed the
IDEA as enacted under the spending power, discussed the differing
liability for statutory and constitutional violations, or delved into the
public policy issues at hand, they would arguably have held against the
availability of § 1983 claims for IDEA violations.
2.

The Consequences of the Decision in W.B. v. Matula

In 1995, three different circuits allowed § 1983 claims based on
IDEA violations.22 8 The following year, the Eighth Circuit decided
Heidemann v. Rother, in which it did not explicitly overturn its earlier
decision allowing § 1983 claims, but did decide that § 1983 was not an
available remedial avenue for an IDEA violation.2 29 A year later, in
1997, the Seventh Circuit became the final court to side with the Second
and Third Circuits in deciding that § 1983 was available to remedy the
IDEA. 230 The Seventh Circuit came to this decision based partly on the
arguments advanced by the Second and Third Circuits. 231 Therefore, if
the Third Circuit had used any of the available arguments to hold against
allowing § 1983 claims, the Seventh may have followed its reasoning.
This possible outcome would have left the Second Circuit as the only
remaining court allowing § 1983 claims for IDEA violations. However,
the Third Circuit did allow the § 1983 claim in Matula, and, by the end
of 1997, there were three circuits allowing § 1983 as a remedy for IDEA
violations.232
In 1998, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard Sellers v. School
Board of Manassas,in which the plaintiffs relied on the argument from

226.

See id. § 1400(d)(1) (declaring purpose of ensuring free appropriate public

education for all disabled children).
227. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 493-94 (3d Cir. 1995).
228. See Matula, 67 F.3d at 494; Digre v. Roseville Sch. Indep. Dist. No. 623, 841
F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1988); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 755 (2d Cir. 1987).
229. See Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
Section 1983 damages were not available for IDEA violations).
230. See Marie 0. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir. 1997).
231. See id. at 620.
232. See cases cited supra note 63.
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Matula.2 33 The Fourth Circuit cited to Matula and then very strongly
disagreed with its reasoning.23 4 The Fourth Circuit went on to hold that
§ 1983 remedies were not available for IDEA violations. 35 Later courts
followed the reasoning in Sellers to determine that the IDEA precluded
§ 1983 claims.2 36 By 2006, there were three circuits on each side of the
split and a number of undecided courts.2 37
However, if Matula had produced a different result, then the Third
Circuit would likely have been a fourth circuit holding that § 1983 was
not an available remedy for IDEA violations. This possible outcome
would have left only two courts on the other side of the split. Further, if
the Seventh Circuit had found the Third Circuit's arguments convincing,
and held against § 1983 remedies, there would have been five circuits
denying § 1983 claims for IDEA violations. The Second Circuit would
be the only remaining court allowing § 1983 remedies. If the Second
Circuit was the only remaining court holding on one side of the issue, it
would likely have been convinced by the other five circuits to reconsider
the issue and decide against the availability of § 1983.
If the Matula court had considered additional arguments besides the
legislative history of the congressional amendment to the IDEA, it may
have decided to deny the § 1983 claim for the alleged IDEA violation.
This decision would have caused the issue to be settled much more
quickly among the other circuits, which would have likely been as
persuaded by the Third Circuit's reasoning, as they were by the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Sellers.238 The Third Circuit had the opportunity
to end this circuit split before it began. However, the Third Circuit had
no evidence that the decision would have this kind of significance.
B.

The Impact A.W. v. Jersey City Schools Will Have on Other Courts
Deciding the Availability of§ 1983 Claimsfor IDEA Violations

The Third Circuit's decision to revisit the issue is as significant as
its earlier holding denying § 1983 damages. The court's holding in
Matula helped to create a circuit split. The recent holding in Jersey City

233. See Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See, e.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (using
reasoning from and citing to Sellers to determine that section 1983 actions are
appropriate for IDEA violations); Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. I of Denver, 233 F.3d 1268,
1272-73 (10th Cir. 2000) (using same reasoning as and citing to Sellers in deciding not to
allow a section 1983 claim for an IDEA violation).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
238. See cases cited supra note 235.
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will likely end the circuit split on availability of § 1983 claims for IDEA
violations.
1.

The Third Circuit's Decision to Revisit the Availability of
§ 1983 for IDEA Violations

The Third Circuit discussed numerous reasons for rehearing the
issue of whether § 1983 can be used to redress IDEA violations, but its
foremost reason was the recent Supreme Court decision in City of
Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams.239 The court also pointed to the circuit
split regarding this issue, as well as the negative treatment its earlier
reasoning in Matula received from the Fourth and Tenth Circuits.24 °
These combined reasons caused the Third Circuit to reconsider, and
ultimately overturn, its earlier decision in Matula.24'
In Jersey City, the Third Circuit began its opinion by stating that it
was reexamining its holding in Matula in light of the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Rancho Palos Verdes.242 However, the Third Circuit did not
have to wait this long to reexamine the holding. Supreme Court
precedent existed in 1995, when the Third Circuit decided Matula, that
would have led the Third Circuit to the conclusion that § 1983 damages
were not available in conjunction with the IDEA.243 Moreover, since
1995, other circuits had held that § 1983 is not available. At any time in
the twelve years between Matula and Jersey City, the Third Circuit could
have reexamined its holding in light of those courts' reasoning.
When the Third Circuit originally heard Matula, there was no
circuit split and little guidance from the Supreme Court or other circuit
courts. 244 However, in 2006, when Jersey City came before the court, a
substantial circuit split had developed on the issue and the Third Circuit
had to reevaluate which side was correct. Since the Fourth Circuit had
decided Sellers in 1998, a trend had started where courts were holding
against the availability of § 1983 claims.245 The Third Circuit's stated
reason for returning to this issue was to reevaluate where it stood in light
of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Rancho Palos Verdes.246 However,
the court also needed to reevaluate where it stood in light of the trend
against § 1983 availability among the circuits. The Third Circuit found

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Sch., 486 F.3d 791, 792 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
See id. at 797.
See id. at 799.
See id. at 792.
See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
See cases cited supra note 66.
See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 792.
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this issue important enough that it was reheard en banc in 2007.247 This
case allowed the Third Circuit to truly consider and to correctly decide
the outcome.
The Third Circuit would likely have agreed with its earlier holding
in Matula had it been the correct application of the law. However, the
court decided that the law required the opposite decision. The court
explained that it used the reasoning from Rancho Palos Verdes in
coming to this decision, but, interestingly, the opinion does not fully
explain the application of that case to the IDEA.24 8 Instead, the court
partially applied the reasoning from Rancho Palos Verdes and then
abruptly stated that it "agree[d] with the reasoning of the ...Fourth and
Tenth Circuits, to say nothing of the Supreme Court in Smith. 2 49 This
statement is important in two ways. First, the statement is a complete
reversal of Matula, which held that the congressional amendment to the
IDEA overturned the holding in Smith.250 Second, the statement suggests
that, while the court found the reasoning from Rancho Palos Verdes
persuasive, it recognizes that the reasoning in Matula may have been
incorrect. By agreeing with the Fourth Circuit, which decided Sellers in
1998, the court is agreeing with reasoning that could have been used to
decide Matula.2 51 Whatever the reasons may have been for revisiting
§ 1983 availability for IDEA violations, the Third Circuit was inspired to
take its time and decide properly on this issue.
2.

The Significance of the Third Circuit's Decision in A. W. v.
Jersey City Public Schools

The Third Circuit's recent decision to overturn its earlier holding
and deny § 1983 claims for IDEA violations will have a great impact on
other courts deciding this issue in the future. At the beginning of 2007,
there were three circuits on each side of the split. 252 When the Third

Circuit switched sides in May 2007, it became the fourth circuit holding
against availability of § 1983, leaving only two circuits still allowing
§ 1983 claims for IDEA violations. This tip in the balance of the split
quickly affected the decisions rendered by the other circuits.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 803.
249. Id. See Jersey City, 486 F.3d at 802. The Third Circuit applied the reasoning
from Rancho Palos Verdes only insofar as noting that the IDEA, similar to the
Telecommunications Act discussed in Rancho Palos Verdes, does not give a textual
indication that § 1983 is available. See id.The court then turned to a discussion of
legislative history, which was not discussed in Rancho Palos Verdes. See id.
250. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the
congressional amendment to the IDEA overturned the holding from Smith v. Robinson).
251.

See discussion supra Part III.A.1.

252.

See discussion supra Part II.C.
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The Ninth Circuit consistently declined to decide on this issue
during the years that the circuit split was evenly balanced. Then, in
September 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Blanchardv. Morton School
District2 53 and agreed with the First, Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits
that § 1983 remedies were not available for an alleged violation of the
IDEA.254 The Ninth Circuit explained that it was "persuaded by the
255
recent thoughtful, well-reasoned opinion of the Third Circuit.,
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was the fifth circuit to decide
against § 1983 availability, causing the circuit split to become five
against two. Now that the split has become unbalanced, more federal
courts of appeals are likely to follow the Third Circuit's recent decision.
In December 2007, the Middle District of Florida, in the Eleventh
Circuit, decided Sammons v. Polk County School Board.256 Although it
has implied § 1983 availability, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has never ruled definitively on this issue. 25 7 The Sammons court
explained why it believed the Eleventh Circuit would now decide that
§ 1983 is not available to remedy IDEA violations.258 To do so, the court
pointed to Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta,5 9 where the Eleventh Circuit
held that § 1983 claims were not available for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act. 260 The
Sammons court found that Holbrook was evidence that the Eleventh
Circuit would not allow § 1983 claims for IDEA violations.2 6' If the
Eleventh Circuit decides to hear this issue, and the reasoning in Sammons
is correct, then it will likely join the five circuits holding that § 1983 is
not available for IDEA violations. A decision by the Eleventh Circuit
would further unbalance the circuit split.
The Supreme Court has declined to hear this issue since its holding
in Smith v. Robinson. It still views Smith as correct when it comes to the

253. 504 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2007).
254. See Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 504 F.3d 771, 774-75 (9th Cir. 2007).
255. Id. at 774.
256. Sammons v. Polk County Sch. Bd., 8:04-CV-2657-T-24 EAJ, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90725 (M.D. Fla. Dec 10, 2007).
257. See N.B. v. Alachua County Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(implying the availability of § 1983 for an alleged IDEA violation after administrative
remedies are exhausted, but declining to rule on whether Section 1983 would be
available).
258. See Sammons, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90725, at *12.
259. 112 F.3d 1522(11th Cir. 1997).
260. See Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, Ga., 112 F.3d 1522, 1530 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that plaintiffs could not maintain a § 1983 claim in lieu of or in addition to a
Rehabilitation Act or Americans with Disabilities Act claim).
261. See Sammons, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90725, at *13.
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availability of § 1983 for IDEA violations.262 Therefore, the Supreme
Court is unlikely to decide to rehear this issue. If the Court does decide
to hear a case on the availability of § 1983 for IDEA violations, it will
likely follow the reasoning in Smith and deny § 1983 claims.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Third Circuit's recent decision in A. W. v. Jersey City Schools
has already had, and will continue to have, an impact on court decisions
regarding whether § 1983 remedies are available for IDEA violations.
The Third Circuit's decision to reexamine Matula and overturn that
earlier holding will allow other previously undecided circuits to agree
with its reasoning and join a majority of circuits holding against the
availability of § 1983 remedies for IDEA violations. The Supreme Court
will likely not hear a case on this issue, allowing the split to resolve
itself. There is a possibility that the Second and Seventh Circuits, which
still allow § 1983 availability, will reexamine their earlier holdings. The
time is ripe for reconsideration in each of these circuits. If the Supreme
Court does hear a case on the issue of § 1983 remedies for IDEA
violations, then it will likely follow Smith v. Robinson and hold that §
1983 remedies are not available for IDEA violations.
There is a possibility that Congress could amend the IDEA again to
include § 1983 remedies, however, an amendment is unlikely. Congress
has not amended the IDEA to include § 1983 in the past twenty years
that the courts of appeals have been deciding these cases, and so are
unlikely to amend it now. Courts holding against § 1983 availability are
still awarding appropriate relief to plaintiffs who prove IDEA
violations.26 3 Congress is unlikely to amend the IDEA so that these
plaintiffs can also receive large damage awards, which are generally a
windfall and have no impact on the educational needs of the child
involved. 264 Additionally, Congress is unlikely to increase the burden on
school boards by increasing the potential for large damage awards.
The Third Circuit's impact has been and will continue to be great.
The Third Circuit has begun the process of agreement between the
United States courts of appeals and had a hand in changing the
262.

See, e.g., City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 121 (2005)

(discussing Smith and using IDEA as an example of a statute with a comprehensive
remedial scheme that precludes § 1983 claims).
263. See Sch. Comm. of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 471 U.S. 359,
370 (1985) (holding that appropriate damages may include injunctive relief or
reimbursement of educational expenses).
264. See Sellers by Sellers v. Sch. Bd. of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 527-28 (4th
Cir. 1998) (explaining that tort-like damages are inconsistent with the IDEA's statutory
scheme and would be very difficult to measure); Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370 (stating that
relief under the IDEA is meant only to ensure a free appropriate public education).
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expectations and possibilities for parties involved in suits involving
IDEA violations. The Third Circuit should be applauded for overturning
its decision in Matula and taking the time to thoroughly think through
this issue. In the future, the danger of large damage awards may no
longer be a consideration when determining how to address the needs of
disabled children. School districts will have one less financial difficulty
to worry about and will be better able to focus on providing a solid
education to all children.

